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Abstract
We introduce the use, monitoring, and enforcement
of integrity constraints in trust management-style au-
thorization systems. We consider what portions of
the policy state must be monitored to detect viola-
tions of integrity constraints. Then we address the
fact that not all participants in a trust management
system can be trusted to assist in such monitoring,
and show how many integrity constraints can be mon-
itored in a conservative manner so that trusted par-
ticipants detect and report if the system enters a pol-
icy state from which evolution in unmonitored por-
tions of the policy could lead to a constraint viola-
tion.
1 Introduction
Trust management [4] (TM) is an approach to man-
aging authorization in environments where author-
ity emanates from multiple sources. Authorization
policy consists of statements issued by many partici-
pants, and resource sharing is facilitated by delegat-
ing authority from one principal to another.
A particular authorization is decided by posing a
query to the system. An evaluation procedure com-
bines the statements issued by all relevant principals
to derive the query’s answer. By adding or removing
a policy statement, a principal can potentially affect
many authorizations of many principals.
One of the difficulties of operating in such a context
is that at present no system exists for monitoring
unexpected consequences of policy changes made by
other principals. Basically, in present TM systems,
delegating trust implies losing a great deal of control
on the policy involved the delegation. Let us first see
three example of this.
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Firstly, resources may become unavailable unex-
pectedly. Consider for instance a team leader who
needs to be informed if members of his team suffer in-
terruption in their authorization for mission-critical
resources. If the team’s mission involves rapid re-
sponse, the notification of interruption should not de-
pend on team members attempting to access a crit-
ical resource and discovering its unavailability only
because the attempt fails. What is needed is that
the policy change triggers a procedure that pushes
the notification to the team leader.
Secondly: properties such as mutual exclusion can-
not be guaranteed. While in the above example, the
exceptional state involved someone losing authoriza-
tion, Having someone unexpectedly gain authoriza-
tion can be just as important to detect. For instance,
it should be possible to trigger an action if a principal
becomes authorized for two mutually exclusive pur-
poses. Mutual exclusion is an approach often used,
for instance in RBAC systems [18], to enforce sepa-
ration of duty, a classic device aimed at preventing
fraud. By ensuring that no individual is authorized
to complete all parts of a sensitive task, the technique
ensures that only a colluding group could misuse the
capability. Because the participants in a trust man-
agement system are autonomous, it is in general not
possible to prevent a principal being given two au-
thorizations. However, cooperating principals should
be able to prevent another principal from gaining two
mutually exclusive authorizations under the control
of the cooperating group. What is needed is a way
to distribute the mutual exclusivity requirement and
monitor policy evolution to ensure that control over
the key authorizations is not delegated outside the
cooperating group.
Thirdly: quality cannot be monitored. Consider
the situation in which the principal A states, for in-
stance, that he considers expert anyone that B con-
siders an expert (A delegates to B the definition of
“expert”). In addition, A expects experts to have a
PhD degree. Now, A has no way of controlling that
all experts added by B actually have doctorates. Of
course, A could modify his policy as follows “A con-
siders expert anyone holding a PhD that B considers
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an expert”. However often it would be preferable for
A to know whether a non-PhD had been added to
the expert list because it might suggest to A that an
exception to A’s policy is acceptable, or that some
other evolution of A’s policy should take place (per-
haps it is time to revoke the trust in B’s experts).
Thus, what A needs is to be able to monitor whether
B ever decides that a non-PhD is an expert. Notice
that this is what would happen in practice: before
delegating to B the definition of expert A would nor-
mally put in place a monitoring activity to guarantee
that B’s expert fulfill the quality criteria. Unfortu-
nately, present decentralized TM systems do not al-
low for such monitoring.
Summarizing, there is a need for a mechanism to
monitor a TM system and to reveal when an ex-
ceptional state has been entered so that appropriate
steps can be taken proactively. Ideally, it would even
be possible to enlist the assistance of others in pre-
venting exceptional states from arising. The problem
of providing such a monitoring system is aggravated
by the fact that changes are made by autonomous
principals that may not agree or be trusted to assist
in the monitoring.
In this paper we introduce a new trust manage-
ment construct called a constraint, inspired by in-
tegrity constraints in database management systems
(see, e.g. [9, 6]), that provides system participants
the ability to monitor the evolution of the policy. The
author of a constraint receives notification when the
constraint is violated. This is achieved by enlisting
the assistance of principals to which authority is del-
egated and triggering constraint checks when those
principals make relevant policy changes. The empha-
sis in this paper is on determining whether a policy
change is relevant, or can be ignored.
In addition we also consider the setting in which
some principals are not trusted or willing to help
monitoring a constraint. As mentioned above, in
some environments, it is not appropriate to assume
that all principals to whom one delegates authority
will assist in monitoring one’s constraints. By provid-
ing a sufficiently expressive constraint language, we
show how to limit to an arbitrary, specified set those
principals that are trusted to cooperate in monitor-
ing a constraint. This is done by allowing a con-
straint to express a security analysis problem of the
kind formulated by Li et al. [15]. Such a constraint
quantifies over policy states that are reachable by
policy changes made by untrusted principals asking
whether a given query holds either in all reachable
states (universal quantification) or in some reachable
state (existential quantification). By checking such a
constraint each time the trusted principals make rel-
evant policy changes, and committing their changes
only if the constraint is satisfied, the trusted princi-
pals can ensure that a state violating the constraint
is never entered, no matter what the untrusted prin-
cipals do. They are able to do this because the un-
trusted principals are unable to affect the validity of
the constraint.
The technical contribution in this paper is a
method to identify portions of the policy state that
must be monitored in order to detect constraint vio-
lations. We do this first under the assumption that
all principals in the system can be trusted to assist in
monitoring the portion of the policy state under their
control. We then relax this assumption by requiring
only that a given portion of the policy can be reliably
monitored. In this case, monitoring is carried out by
using security analysis to assess the possibility of the
constraint becoming violated by policy changes that
cannot be monitored directly.
Section 2 discusses the TM policy language that we
use. Section 3 identifies the portion of the policy state
to be monitored for constraint violations, assuming
all portions can be monitored. Section 4 shows how
to monitor constraints for potential violations when
not all parts of the policy state can be monitored
directly. Section 5 discusses related work. Section 6
concludes. Some proofs are reported in the appendix.
2 Preliminaries
Trust management [4, 2, 3, 17, 7, 5, 10, 11, 16, 15, 12,
14, 19] is an approach to access control in decentral-
ized distributed systems with access control decisions
based on policy statements issued by multiple princi-
pals. In trust management systems, statements that
are maintained in a distributed manner are often digi-
tally signed to ensure their authenticity and integrity;
such statements are sometimes called credentials or
certificates. This section presents the trust manage-
ment language RT0 [15], which we use in this paper.
The Language RT0
A principal is a uniquely identified individual or pro-
cess. Principals are denoted by names starting with
an uppercase, typically, A, B, D.
A principal can define a role, which is indicated
by principal’s name followed by the role name, sepa-
rated by a dot. For instance A.r, and GMU .students
are roles. For the sake of simplicity we assume that
A is the owner (or the administrator) of A.r, though
the results of this papers apply also in the case A.r
is owned by some other principal. We use names
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starting with a lowercase letter (sometimes with sub-
scripts) to indicate role names.
A role denotes a set of principals (the principals
that populate it, i.e., the members of the role). To
indicate which principals populate a role, RT0 allows
the owning principal to issue four kind of policy state-
ments :
• Simple Member : A.r ←− D
With this statement A asserts that D is a mem-
ber of A.r.
• Simple Inclusion: A.r ←− B.r1
With this statement A asserts that A.r includes
(all members of) B.r1. This represents a dele-
gation from A to B, as B may add principals
to become members of the role A.r by issuing
statements defining (and extending) B.r1.
• Linking Inclusion: A.r ←− A.r1.r2
We call A.r1.r2 a linked role. With this state-
ment A asserts that A.r includes B.r2 for every
B that is a member of A.r1. This represents a
delegation from A to all the members of the role
A.r1.
• Intersection Inclusion: A.r ←− B1.r1 ∩B2.r2
We call B1.r1 ∩B2.r2 an intersection. With this
statement A asserts that A.r includes every prin-
cipal who is a member of both B1.r1 and B2.r2.
This represents partial delegations from A to B1
and to B2.
For any statement A.r←− e, A.r is called the head
and e is called the body of the statement. We write
head(A.r←−e) = A.r. The set of statements having
head A.r is called the definition of A.r.
The definition of RT0 given here is a slightly sim-
plified (yet expressively equivalent) version of the one
given in [15]. A policy state (state for short, indicated
by P) is a set of policy statements. Given a state P ,
we define the following: Principals(P) is the set of
principals in P , Names(P) is the set of role names
in P , and Roles(P) = {A.r | A ∈ Principals(P), r ∈
Names(P)}.
To express constraints, we need one last definition:
Definition 2.1 Positive roles expressions are de-
fined by the following grammar:
• sets of principals are positive role expressions,
• roles are positive role expressions,
• union and intersections of positive role expres-
sions are positive role expressions. 
E.g., A.r, A.r ∪ {A,B} and A.r ∩B.r1.r2. Positive
role expressions, and are denoted by Greek letters,
φ, λ, and ρ. A positive role expression containing no
roles (but only sets of principals) is called static.
Semantics
The semantics of a policy state is defined by translat-
ing it into a logic program. The semantic program,
SP(P), of a state P , is a Prolog program has one
ternary predicate m. Intuitively, m(A, r,D) means
that D is a member of the role A.r.
Definition 2.2 (Semantic Program) Given a
state P , the semantic program SP(P) for it is the
logic program defined as follows: (here symbols that
start with “?” represent logical variables)
• For each A.r←−D ∈ P add to SP(P) the clause
m(A, r,D)
• For each A.r←− B.r1 ∈ P , add to SP(P) the
clause
m(A, r, ?Z) :− m(B, r1, ?Z)
• For each A.r←−A.r1.r2 ∈ P add to SP(P) the
clause
m(A, r, ?Z) :− m(A, r1, ?Y ), m(?Y, r2, ?Z)
• For each A.r←−B1.r1∩B2.r2 ∈ P add to SP(P)
the clause
m(A, r, ?Z) :− m(B1, r1, ?Z), m(B2, r2, ?Z). 
We can now define the semantics of a role in a state.
Definition 2.3 (Semantics) Given a state P , the
semantics of a role A.r is defined in terms of atoms
entailed by the semantic program:
• [[A.r]]SP(P) = {Z|SP(P) |= m(A, r, Z)} 
We extend this semantics to positive role expressions
in the natural way as follows:
[[{D1, . . . , Dn}]]SP(P) = {D1, . . . , Dn}
[[φ1 ∪ φ2]]SP(P) = [[φ1]]SP(P) ∪ [[φ2]]SP(P)
[[φ1 ∩ φ2]]SP(P) = [[φ1]]SP(P) ∩ [[φ2]]SP(P)
3 Constraints
Consider a state P , which might change in time. We
are interested in defining a constraint, which intu-
itively is a query that is intended to hold throughout
the state changes. To this end, we focus on the class
of constraints already considered for the purposes of
security analysis in [13]. These constraints express
set containment.
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Definition 3.1 A constraint is an expression of the
form 〈O, λ ⊑ ̺〉, in which O is a principal called
the owner of the constraint, and λ and ̺ are positive
role expressions. 
The following definition clarifies that ⊑ represents
set containment.
Definition 3.2 Let P be a state and Q be the con-
straint 〈O, λ ⊑ ̺〉, we say that
• P satisfies Q (P ⊢ Q) iff [[λ]]SP(P) ⊆ [[̺]]SP(P)
(P violates Q otherwise) 
Constraints of this form can capture many impor-
tant and intuitive requirements.
• Consider 〈O, {Bob} ∩ A.r ⊑ ∅〉. This constraint
captures a safety requirement that Bob must not
become a member of A.r.
• The constraint 〈O, {Alice} ⊑ A.r〉 captures
the availability requirement that Alice must be
authorized for A.r.
• The constraint 〈O, A.manager ∩ B.controller ⊑
∅〉 captures the mutual exclusivity require-
ment that no one must be authorized for both
A.manager and B.controller.
Example 3.3 Suppose the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF ) operates a
database containing information about hazardous
materials (HAZMAT) for use by emergency response
personnel. The ATF individually authorizes users so
as to retain tight control over the sensitive informa-
tion contained in the database. It does this by issuing
statements such as:
ATF .hazmatDB ←− Rollins (1)
The Emergency Response Center (Emergency)
wants to ensure that all its hazmat emergency re-
sponse personnel have access to the database at all
times. This is expressed by the constraint
〈Emergency,
Emergency.hazmatPersonnel ⊑ ATF.hazmatDB〉
We assume that Emergency.hazmatPersonnel is
defined by the collection of statements (2) · · · (8) in
Table 1. Suppose the following two statements are
added:
Police.responsePersonnel ←− Rollins (9)
Police.responsePersonnel ←− Burke (10)
When these statements are added, it must be checked
whether they cause violations of the constraint. Cre-
dential (9) does not cause a violation, but (10) does,
and the Emergency Response Center must be notified
accordingly. 
3.1 Monitoring Constraints
We now see how we can put in place a system for
monitoring constraint violations. Let P be a state,
and consider the constraint Q = 〈O, λ ⊑ ̺〉. As-
suming that P changes in time, we are interested in
monitoring when Q is violated.
Definition 3.4 Let P 7−→ P ′ be a state change from
P to P ′. We say that
• the change violates Q if P ⊢ Q and P ′ 6⊢ Q
Notice that if a change violates the constraint, then
there exists D such that D 6∈ [[λ]]SP(P) \ [[̺]]SP(P),
while D ∈ [[λ]]SP(P′) \ [[̺]]SP(P′). This remark points
out an important feature of containment constraints:
that if they are violated then there exists a specific
set of principals violating it.
To monitor the system, a feature of RT we are
going to exploit is its monotonicity: adding a state-
ment to P cannot cause the set semantics of a role to
shrink. Similarly, removing a statement cannot cause
the set semantics to grow. Formally, for each role A.r
and each statement stmt:
[[A.r]]SP(P) ⊆ [[A.r]]SP(P ∪ {stmt})
[[A.r]]SP(P) ⊇ [[A.r]]SP(P\{stmt})
(1)
Therefore, adding a statement to P can only augment
the set [[λ]]SP(P) and [[̺]]SP(P). Consequently, if we
assume that P initially satisfies λ ⊑ ̺, we see the
following:
• Adding a statement to P can yield to a violation
of λ ⊑ ̺ only if the addition affects [[λ]]SP(P).
• Removing a statement from P can yield to a
violation of λ ⊑ ̺ only if the removal affects
[[̺]]SP(P).
We now want to further isolate the roles that might
influence the satisfaction of a constraint.
Example 3.5 Consider the following set of state-
ments.
A.r ←− A.r.r (2)
A.r ←− B (3)
B.r ←− C (4)
C.r ←− D.r (5)
E.r ←− F (6)
It is easy to see that [[A.r]]SP(P) is {B,C}. Notice
now that if we add a statement D.r ←− E, then
[[A.r]]SP(P) grows to {B,C,E, F}. Therefore we can
say that D.r may positively affect A.r. We see that
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Table 1: Policy State of Example 3.3
ATF .hazmatDB ←− Rollins (1)
Emergency.hazmatPersonnel ←− Emergency.responsePersonnel ∩ ATF .hazmatT raining (2)
Emergency.responsePersonnel ←− Emergency.dept.responsePersonnel (3)
Emergency.dept ←− F ire (4)
Emergency.dept ←− Police (5)
ATF .hazmatT raining ←− Rollins (6)
ATF .hazmatT raining ←− Burke (7)
ATF .hazmatT raining ←− O ′Connel (8)
Additional Statements
Police.responsePersonnel ←− Rollins (9)
Police.responsePersonnel ←− Burke (10)
The semantics of P = {(1), . . . , (8)} is
[[ATF.hazmatDB]]SP(P) = {Rollins}
[[ATF.hazmatT raining]]SP(P) = {Rollins,Burke,O
′Connel}
[[Emergency.hazmatPersonnel]]SP(P) = ∅
[[Emergency.responsePersonnel]]SP(P) = ∅
[[Emergency.dept]]SP(P) = {F ire,Police}
The semantics of P ’ = P ∪ {(9), (10)} is
[[ATF.hazmatDB]]SP(P′) = {Rollins}
[[ATF.hazmatT raining]]SP(P′) = {Rollins,Burke,O
′Connel}
[[Emergency.hazmatPersonnel]]SP(P′) = {Rollins,Burke}
[[Emergency.responsePersonnel]]SP(P′) = {Rollins,Burke}
[[Emergency.dept]]SP(P) = {F ire,Police}
[[Police.responsePersonnel]]SP(P′) = {Rollins,Burke}
5
{A.r,B.r, C.r,D.r} is the set of roles that can posi-
tively affect A.r. Dually, we can define the set of roles
that may affect the shrinking of [[A.r]]SP(P). Here, it
is easy to see that the only way of “reducing” the se-
mantics [[A.r]]SP(P) of A.r is by removing one of the
statements (2), (3) or (4). Since these statements de-
fine the roles A.r and B.r we can say that {A.r,B.r}
is the set of roles that can negatively affect A.r. 
This section constructs two sets of roles whose defi-
nitions determine the membership of a given role X.u
in state P . If the membership of X.u were to grow,
some role in one of these sets would have to have a
new statement in its definition, and if the member-
ship of X.u were to shrink, some role in the other
set would have to have a statement in its definition
revoked.
Positive Dependencies
Given a set P and a role A.r we want to isolate a set
ΓP(A.r) of roles we have to monitor, as they might
affect the growth of [[A.r]]SP(P).
Definition 3.6 Let A.r be a role and P be a state;
ΓP(A.r) is the least set of roles containing A.r and
satisfying the following:
• If B.r0 ∈ ΓP (A.r) and B.r0←−B.r1 ∈ P , then
B.r1 ∈ ΓP (A.r).
• If B.r0 ∈ ΓP(A.r) and B.r0 ←− B.r1.r2 ∈ P ,
then B.r1 ∈ ΓP(A.r) and X.r2 ∈ ΓP (A.r) for all
X ∈ [[B.r1]]SP(P).
• If B.r0 ∈ ΓP(A.r) and B.r0←−B1.r1 ∩ . . . ∩
Bn.rn ∈ P , then for each i ∈ [1, n] Bi.ri ∈
ΓP(A.r). 
The main properties of ΓP (.) we will make use
of are summarized in the following lemma, which is
proved in the appendix
Lemma 3.7 Let P ′ = P ∪ {stmt}, where
head(stmt) 6∈ ΓP(A.r), then
(a) [[A.r]]SP(P) = [[A.r]]SP(P′), and
(b) ΓP(A.r) = ΓP′(A.r).
Moreover, if P ′ is obtained from P by (a) adding zero
or more statements whose head is not in ΓP(A.r), and
(b) removing zero or more statements, then
(c) [[A.r]]SP(P) ⊇ [[A.r]]SP(P′), and
(d) ΓP(A.r) ⊇ ΓP′(A.r). 
Example 3.8
• Returning to Example 3.3, the left-hand side of
the constraint
Emergency.hazmatPersonnel ⊑ ATF .hazmatDB
is Emergency.hazmatPersonnel. So
ΓP(Emergency.hazmatPersonnel) =
{ Emergency.hazmatPersonnel,
Emergency.responsePersonnel,
ATF .hazmatT raining,
Emergency.dept,
F ire.responsePersonnel,
Police.responsePersonnel }
is the set of roles for which addition of new state-
ments must be monitored.
• Consider the policy state in Example 3.5. Then
ΓP (A.r) = {A.r,B.r, C.r,D.r}.
• Suppose P contains only the statement
{A.r0 ←− A.r1.r2, }. Then ΓP(A.r0) =
{A.r0, A.r1}, and [[A.r0]]SP(P) = ∅. Now, if we
add a new statement A.r1 ←− B to P (obtain-
ing P ′) then [[A.r0]]SP(P′) is still the empty set,
while ΓP(A.r0) is now {A.r0, A.r1, B.r2}. 
For efficiency reasons, we would like ΓP(A.r) to be
as small as possible, while maintaining the properties
stated in Lemma 3.7. There are two reasons why
ΓP(A.r) is non-minimal: the first reason is that an
intersection inclusion can act as a filter. For instance,
if A.r ←− B1.r1 ∩ B2.r2 ∈ P and [[B1.r1]]SP(P) =
∅, there is no point in adding B2.r2 to ΓP(A.r) as
any change to B2.r2 will not affect the membership
to A.r. The second reason concerns linked roles: if
A.r ←− A.r1.r2 ∈ P and there exists no role B.r2
such that for some D, D ∈ [[B.r2]]SP(P) \ [[A.r]]SP(P),
then we could avoid adding A.r1, to ΓP(A.r), as any
addition to B2.r2 would not affect the membership
to A.r. However, refining the definition ΓP(A.r) to
take these factors into consideration would make its
definition more complex than seems practical.
Negative Dependencies
Now, we need to isolate the dual of ΓP(A.r), i.e., a
set of roles that might cause [[A.r]]SP(P) to shrink.
To this end, we say that that Σ is a P-support of D
for A.r if the roles in Σ carry enough information to
demonstrate that D ∈ [[A.r]]SP(P). We denote by P|Σ
the restriction of P to the roles in Σ, P|Σ = {stmt ∈
P|head(stmt) ∈ Σ}
Definition 3.9 Let A.r be a role, D be a principal,
P be a set of statements and and Σ be a set of roles.
6
• We say that Σ is a P-support of D for A.r if
D ∈ [[A.r]]SP(P|Σ ).
• For L ⊆ Principals(P), we say that Σ is a P-
support of L for A.r if D ∈ [[A.r]]SP(P|Σ ) for
every D ∈ L.
• We say that Σ is a P-support for A.r if and only
if it is a P-support of every D ∈ [[A.r]]SP(P). 
Example 3.10
(i) Consider again the policy state in Example 3.5.
Any set containing {A.r,B.r} as a subset is a
support for A.r.
(ii) In case of redundancies, minimal support might
not be unique. Consider
A.r←−B.r
A.r←−C.r
B.r←−F
C.r←−F
Here, both {A.r,B.r} and {A.r, C.r} are support
for A.r. 
We can now state the counterpart of Lemma 3.7.
Lemma 3.11 Let A.r be a role, D be a principal, P
be a state and Σ be a P-support of D for A.r. Then
1. D ∈ [[A.r]]SP(P)
Moreover, if P ′ is obtained from P by (a) removing
zero or more statements whose head is not in Σ, and
(b) adding zero or more statements, then
2. Σ is a P ′-support for A.r, and therefore
3. D ∈ [[A.r]]SP(P′)
Proof. Point 1 follows immediately from the fact that,
by monotonicity, [[A.r]]SP(P) ⊇ [[A.r]]SP(P|Σ ). For
points 2 and 3, by the construction of P ′ we have
that P|Σ ⊆ P ′, so the results follows from the defi-
nition of support and the fact that the semantics is
monotonic. 
To build a P-support of D for A.r one basically
has to collect all the roles used to prove that D ∈
[[A.r]]SP(P). In the appendix we give an algorithm
to compute minimal P-support while evaluating role
membership.
Putting Things Together
We can now prove the result we were aiming at.
Suppose we need to deploy the integrity constraint
Q = λ ⊑ ̺ on P . The first step we need to take is to
check if P satisfies Q. This is can be done as follows:
1. First, [[λ]]SP(P) is computed.
2. Then, for each D ∈ [[λ]]SP(P), we check that D ∈
[[̺]]SP(P).
In step 2, while checking that D ∈ [[λ]]SP(P) it is
usually possible to build for free a P-support of D
in ̺. Once we have checked that P satisfies Q, we
want to make sure that changes to P do not cause a
violation of Q. For this we have the following.
Theorem 3.12 (Main) Assume that P satisfies the
constraint 〈O, λ ⊑ ̺〉. Let Σ be a P-support of
[[λ]]SP(P) for ̺, and let P 7−→ P
′ be a (possibly mul-
tistep) change from P to P ′. If
(i) ∀ stmt ∈ P ′\P , head(stmt) 6∈ ΓP (λ), and
(ii) ∀ stmt ∈ P\P ′, head(stmt) 6∈ Σ
Then P ′ satisfies the constraint 〈O, λ ⊑ ̺〉 as well.
Proof.
Take any D ∈ [[λ]]SP(P′)
By Lemma 3.7, D ∈ [[λ]]SP(P)
Since by assumption, P ⊢ λ ⊑ ̺, D ∈ [[̺]]SP(P)
By Lemma 3.11, D ∈ [[̺]]SP(P′)
Hence the thesis. 
Theorem 3.12 also shows that, as long as the
changes to P satisfy (i) and (ii), we do not have to
recompute the set ΓP(λ) or the support Σ. Techni-
cally, this is due to the fact that changes satisfying
(i) and (ii) do not affect Σ (by Lemma 3.11, Σ is still
a support of ̺), and can only reduce the set ΓP(λ)
(by Lemma 3.7). When statements defining roles in
ΓP(λ) are issued, (i) is violated, and when statements
defining roles in Σ are revoked, (ii) is violated. At
these times, the constraint must be checked and the
sets ΓP(λ) and Σ must be recomputed.
The theorem indicates how a system for monitoring
constraints should be deployed: the first step (men-
tioned above) is to check that P satisfies λ ⊑ ̺.
While doing this, we can build an appropriate Σ.
Secondly, we have to build ΓP(λ). Thirdly, we need
to put in place monitoring of the roles in Σ and in
ΓP(λ) such that each time a statement defining a role
in ΓP(λ) (resp. Σ) is added to (resp. deleted from) P ,
the constraint owner is warned. When the constraint
owner receives a warning he has to (a) check whether
the constraint still holds, and (b) recompute ΓP(λ)
and Σ.
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Example 3.13
• Returning to Example 3.3, to monitor
〈Emergency, Emergency.hazmatPersonnel ⊑
ATF .hazmatDB〉, we must monitor
revocation of definitions of roles in
some P-support of each member of
[[Emergency.hazmatPersonnel]]SP(P)
for ATF .hazmatDB. In this example,
Σ = {ATF.hazmatDB} is a P-support of
each such member for ATF .hazmatDB.
We must also monitor additions to
ΓP(Emergency.hazmatPersonnel), as dis-
cussed in Example 3.8. If new statements
are added defining other roles, no action has
to be taken. Similarly, if statement (10),
Police.responsePersonnel ←− Burke, were
removed, no action would be necessary because
Police.responsePersonnel is not in Σ.
• Consider now Example 3.10 (ii), together with
the query {F} ⊑ A.r. To apply Theorem
3.12, we have to choose one support of F for A.r
(the two candidate support are {A.r, B.r} and
{A.r, C.r}) and monitor the roles in it. Sup-
pose we choose Σ = {A.r, B.r}. Suppose we
now remove the statement B.r←−F . This does
not yield to a violation of the constraint, but
we do have to recompute Σ, which now becomes
{A.r, C.r}.
• Finally, it is also instructive to see that a change
in ΓP (λ) might require recomputing Σ, even if it
does not entail a violation of the constraint. Let
P be the following set of statements:
A.r ←− E
B.r ←− C.r
B.r ←− D.r
C.r ←− E
D.r ←− F
together with the constraint A.r ⊑ B.r. This
constraint is satisfied and to monitor its evolu-
tion we have to monitor the roles in ΓP (A.r) =
{A.r} and Σ = {B.r, C.r}. Now if we add the
statement A.r←− F then the constraint owner
is warned that a change in ΓP(λ) has occurred.
The constraint owner can check that the con-
straint is still satisfied in P ′ = P ∪ {A.r←−F};
however Σ has to be recomputed to take into ac-
count that it should be a P ′-support of F too.
The new Σ is {B.r, C.r, D.r}. 
3.2 Alternative Support Definition
We have defined the P-support Σ to be a set of roles.
Alternatively, we could have defined Σ to be a set of
credentials.
Definition 3.14 (Alternative definition of support)
Let A.r be a role, D be a principal, P be a set of
statements and and Σ ⊆ P be a set of credentials
• We say that Σ is a P-support of D for A.r if
D ∈ [[A.r]]SP(Σ).
• For L ⊆ Principals(P), we say that Σ is a P-
support of L for A.r if D ∈ [[A.r]]SP(Σ) for every
D ∈ L.
• We say that Σ is a P-support for A.r if and only
if it is a P-support of every D ∈ [[A.r]]SP(P). 
Monitoring constraint using this definition requires
more machinery than using Definition 3.9, but it
could yield to a more efficient implementation. With
this definition one monitors the credentials and not
the roles which might affect the right hand side of
the constraint. Therefore, to apply this definition
one needs a mechanism for monitoring every single
credential of Σ (which might be difficult).
Theorem 3.15 (Main with alternative definition)
Assume that P satisfies the constraint 〈O, λ ⊑ ̺〉.
Let Σ be a P-support of [[λ]]SP(P) for ̺ (according
to Definition 3.14), and let P 7−→ P ′ be a (possibly
multistep) change from P to P ′. If
(i) ∀ stmt ∈ P ′\P , head(stmt) 6∈ ΓP (λ), and
(ii) ∀ stmt ∈ P\P ′, stmt 6∈ Σ
Then P ′ satisfies 〈O, λ ⊑ ̺〉 as well. 
The advantage of Definition 3.14, is that the hy-
pothesis of Theorem 3.15 hold more often than those
of Theorem 3.12. In other words, using Definition
3.14 one has to check whether the query still holds
and to recalculate ΓP(λ) and Σ less often than with
Definition 3.9.
4 Monitoring When Not All
Participants Are Trusted to
Help
The previous section showed how principals in a
trust management system can monitor integrity con-
straints by monitoring changes in the definitions of
certain roles. This section considers the problem of
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monitoring integrity constraints when not all princi-
pals in the system agree to assist in monitoring their
roles. The idea is to make the assumption that the
owners of a certain set of roles are trusted to mon-
itor new statements added to their definitions. We
call these the growth-trusted roles and denote them
by G. Similarly, the owners of a set of shrink-trusted
roles, denoted S, are trusted to monitor statements
removed from their definitions. The owners of these
roles are trusted to test whether changes made to un-
trusted roles could violate the constraint and, if so,
to signal that potential violation. We call the pair
R = (G,S) a role monitor because it indicates the
roles that can be monitored with respect to growth
and shrinkage.
Definition 4.1 (Reachable) In the presence of a
role monitor R, we say that P ′ is R-reachable from
P if P ′ can be obtained from P without adding any
statements defining roles in G or removing any state-
ments defining roles in S. That is to say, {stmt ∈
P ′|head(stmt) ∈ G} ⊆ P and {stmt ∈ P|head(stmt) ∈
S} ⊆ P ′. 
The problem we address is to monitor whether the
system ever enters a state P from which some reach-
able P ′ violates λ ⊑ ̺. This problem is closely
related to the security analysis problem [13], which
also is defined in terms of a role monitor R = (G,S),
although in that context it is called a restriction rule.
In security analysis, the definitions of roles in G are
assumed not to grow and those of roles in S, not to
shrink; the security analysis problem is to determine
whether other changes to the policy state could cause
a constraint to become violated. In [13] it was shown
that this problem is decidable (coNEXP) for RT0
over the class of constraints we consider here, and
that it is polynomial for an important subclass of
those constraints. What has not been shown before,
and what we show in this section, is how to identify
subsets of G and S that need to be monitored so that
security analysis can be used to maintain integrity
constraints.
In the rest of this section, we introduce alternative
semantics that can be used to answer questions about
policy states that are reachable through changes to
the definitions of untrusted roles. We then formal-
ize sets of roles that must be monitored and show
that monitoring these roles is sufficient. Finally, we
provide a method for monitoring integrity constraints
when not all principals in the system are trusted to
assist the process.
Alternative Semantics
We now recall two non-standard semantics for a pol-
icy state P and role monitor R. These were intro-
duced [13] for computing the lower and upper bounds
on role memberships under the assumption that the
definition of roles in G do not grow and the definition
of roles in S do not shrink. We first recall the lower-
bound program for a state P and a restrictionR; this
program enables one to compute the lower-bounds of
every role.
Definition 4.2 (Lower-Bound Program [13])
Given P and R, the lower-bound program for them,
LB(P ,R), is constructed as follows:
(b1) For each A.r←−D in P|R, add
lb (A, r, D)
(b2) For each A.r←−B.r1 in P|R, add
lb(A, r, ?Z) :− lb(B, r1, ?Z)
(b3) For each A.r←−A.r1.r2 in P|R, add
lb(A, r, ?Z) :− lb(A, r1, ?Y ), lb(?Y, r2, ?Z)
(b4) For each A.r←−B1.r1 ∩B2.r2 in P|R, add
lb(A, r, ?Z) :− lb(B1, r1, ?Z), lb(B2, r2, ?Z). 
We now recall the upper-bound program for a state
P and a role monitor R. This program enables one
to simulate the upper-bound of any role.
Definition 4.3 (Upper-Bound Program [13])
Given P and R = (G,S), their upper-bound pro-
gram, UB(P ,R), is constructed as follows. (⊤ is a
special principal symbol not occurring in P , R, or
any query Q.)
(u) Add ub(⊤, ?r, ?Z)
(u0) For each A.r ∈ Roles(P)\G, add
ub(A, r, ?Z)
(u1) For each A.r←−D in P , add
ub(A, r,D)
(u2) For each A.r←−B.r1 in P , add
ub(A, r, ?Z) :− ub(B, r1, ?Z)
(u3) For each A.r←−A.r1.r2 in P , add
ub(A, r, ?Z) :− ub(A, r1, ?Y ), ub(?Y, r2, ?Z)
(u4) For each A.r←−B1.r1 ∩B2.r2 in P , add
ub(A, r, ?Z) :− ub(B1, r1, ?Z), ub(B2, r2, ?Z) 
The rules (u1) to (u4) follow from the meanings
of the four types of statements and are similar to
the semantic program construction in Definition 2.2.
The rule (u0) means that for any role A.r not in
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G, the upper-bound of A.r contains every principal.
The rule (u) means that for any role name r, the
upper-bound of ⊤.r contains every principal. This is
so because ⊤ does not appear in G. The rule (u) is
needed because given A.r←−A.r1.r2, where A.r ∈ G
and A.r1 6∈ G, we should ensure that the upper-bound
of A.r contains every principal. We define:
[[A.r]]UB(P) = {Z | ub(P) |= m(A, r, Z)} (7)
[[A.r]]LB(P) = {Z | lb(P) |= m(A, r, Z)} (8)
And by definition we have that
Remark 4.4
• If A.r 6∈ S then [[A.r]]LB(P) = ∅.
• If A.r 6∈ G then [[A.r]]UB(P) = Principals(P) ∪
{⊤}. 
The next theorem gives the link between the two
new semantics and the problem of checking that a
constraint is satisfied in all reachable P ′.
Theorem 4.5 ([13]) Let R be a role monitor, P be
a state, and λ ⊑ ̺ be a containment constraint.
• If [[λ]]UB(P) ⊆ [[̺]]LB(P) then P
′ ⊢ λ ⊑ ̺ for
each P ′ reachable from P ,
• if either λ or ̺ is static (i.e., it is a set of prin-
cipals) then P ′ ⊢ λ ⊑ ̺ for each P ′ reachable
from P implies that [[λ]]UB(P) ⊆ [[̺]]LB(P)
1. 
We now proceed as in the previous section, by iden-
tifying the roles we have to monitor.
Positive Dependencies, with Untrusted Roles
In the light of Theorem 4.5, given a state P , a role
monitor R, and a role A.r, we want to isolate a
set ΓGP (A.r) of roles we have to monitor, as they
might affect the growth of [[A.r]]UB(P). One might
think that when some roles are untrusted, we need
only restrict ΓP(A.r) to the G-roles (or to check that
ΓP(A.r) ⊆ G). The following example shows that this
is not adequate. Consider the constraint A.r ⊑ B.r,
where A.r is defined by
A.r ←− C.r ∩ D.r (9)
D.r ← E.r (10)
. . .
1Actually, though we do not prove it here, we believe that
a stronger version of this part holds, stating that if ΓP (λ) ∩
ΓP (̺) = ∅ then P
′ ⊢ λ ⊑ ̺ for each P ′ reachable from P
implies that [[λ]]UB(P) ⊆ [[̺]]LB(P).
A.r depends on C.r, D.r and E.r (which are in
ΓP(A.r)), and, if we used the method of the pre-
vious section, we would have to monitor all three of
them. We now make two observations about mon-
itoring when it is not possible to monitor all three
roles. First, if E.r is not in G, we cannot monitor
it. This implies that there is no point in monitoring
D.r either, as it directly depends on E.r. Second if
D.r is not in G, there is no point in monitoring it nor
in monitoring E.r (which can only influence A.r via
D.r).
To cope with this we now define the P-core of G,
which intuitively contains those role of G which ad-
ditionally do not fully depend on an untrusted role.
Definition 4.6 (P-Core) Let P be a state and G
be a set of roles. The P-core of G, coreP(G), is the
maximal subset of G such that
• If A.r←−B.r1 ∈ P , and B.r1 6∈ coreP(G), then
A.r 6∈ coreP(G)
• If A.r ←− A.r1.r2 ∈ P , and A.r1 6∈ coreP(G),
then A.r 6∈ coreP(G).
• If A.r←−A.r1.r2 ∈ P , and ∃B ∈ [[A.r1]]UB(P)
such that B.r2 6∈ coreP(G), then A.r 6∈
coreP(G).
• If A.r←−A1.r1 ∩ . . . ∩An.rn ∈ P , and for every
i, Ai.ri 6∈ coreP(G), then A.r 6∈ coreP(G). 
The following proposition is proved in the ap-
pendix.
Proposition 4.7 Let P be a set of statements and
G be a set of roles.
• If A.r 6∈ coreP(G), then [[A.r]]UB(P) =
Principals(P) ∪ {⊤}. 
We now construct the set of roles that must be
monitored for new definitions to detect growth in a
role’s membership.
Definition 4.8 Let A0.r0 be a role in coreP(G), R
be a role monitor, and P be a state; ΓGP (A0.r0) ⊆
Roles(P) is the least set satisfying the following:
• If A0.r0 ∈ coreP(G), A0.r0 ∈ Γ
G
P (A0.r0).
• If A.r ∈ ΓGP (A0.r0), and A.r←−B.r1 ∈ P , then
B.r1 ∈ Γ
G
P (A0.r0).
• If A.r ∈ ΓGP (A0.r0) and A.r ←− A.r1.r2 ∈ P ,
then A.r1 ∈ Γ
G
P (A0.r0) and X.r2 ∈ Γ
G
P (A0.r0)
for all X ∈ [[A.r1]]UB(P)
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• If A.r ∈ ΓGP (A0.r0) and A.r ←− A1.r1 ∩ . . . ∩
An.rn ∈ P , then, for each i ∈ [1, n] if Ai.ri ∈
coreP(G), Ai.ri ∈ Γ
G
P (A0.r0). 
It is easy to prove by a simple induction on the
steps in the iterative construction of ΓGP (A0.r0) that
ΓGP (A0.r0) ⊆ coreP(G)
We now have the counterpart of Lemma 3.7.
Lemma 4.9 Assume ⊤ 6∈ [[A.r]]UB(P). Let R be a
role monitor, P ′ = P ∪ {stmt}, where head(stmt) 6∈
ΓGP (A.r), then
(a) [[A.r]]UB(P) = [[A.r]]UB(P′), and
(b) ΓGP (A.r) = Γ
G
P′(A.r).
Moreover, if P ′ is obtained from P by (a) adding zero
or more statements whose head is not in ΓGP (A.r), and
(b) removing zero or more statements, then
(c) [[A.r]]UB(P) ⊇ [[A.r]]UB(P′), and
(d) ΓGP (A.r) ⊇ Γ
G
P′(A.r).
Proof (sketch). The result follows by using reasoning
similar to that used for proving Lemma 3.7. 
Negative Dependencies, with Untrusted Roles
To handle the right hand side of the constraints we
simply have to generalize Lemma 3.11 in the obvious
way by taking into account the presence of the role
monitor. The proof of this lemma is also identical to
that of Lemma 3.11
Lemma 4.10 Let R = (G,S) be a role monitor, A.r
be a role, D be a principal, P be a state and Σ be a
P-support of D for A.r such that Σ ⊆ S. Then
1. D ∈ [[A.r]]LB(P)
Moreover, if P ′ is obtained from P by (a) removing
zero or more statements whose head is not in Σ, and
(b) adding zero or more statements, then
2. Σ is a P ′-support for A.r, and therefore
3. D ∈ [[A.r]]LB(P′). 
Recall that by Remark 4.4, if A.r 6∈ S then we have
that [[A.r]]LB(P) = ∅. Consequently, it is easy to
show that if D ∈ [[A.r]]LB(P), then there exists a P-
support of D for A.r consisting of roles that are in
S.
Putting Things Together
We can now prove the result we were aiming at. Dif-
ferently from the case in which all roles were trusted,
we now want to check that λ ⊑ ̺ holds in any R-
reachable state P ′. The additional problem here is
we cannot rely on the cooperation of the roles that
are not in G (resp. S) in monitoring the constraint
and telling the constraint owner when a statement
defining a role in ΓP(λ) is added (resp. a statement
defining a role in Σ is removed). Because of this we
refer to two “pessimistic” semantics, [[λ]]UB(P) and
[[̺]]LB(P), and we check if [[λ]]UB(P) ⊆ [[̺]]LB(P). If
this does not hold, then, by Theorem 4.5 the chance
is high that in some reachable P ′ the constraint is
violated. If [[λ]]UB(P) ⊆ [[̺]]LB(P) does hold, then we
can apply the following:
Theorem 4.11 (Main with Untrusted Roles)
Let R = (G,S) be a role monitor. Assume that
[[λ]]UB(P) ⊆ [[̺]]LB(P). Let Σ be a P-support of
[[λ]]UB(P) for ̺ such that Σ ⊆ S, and let P 7−→ P
′
be a (possibly multistep) change from P to P ′. If
(i) ∀ stmt ∈ P ′\P , head(stmt) 6∈ ΓGP (λ), and
(ii) ∀ stmt ∈ P\P ′, head(stmt) 6∈ Σ
Then [[λ]]UB(P′) ⊆ [[̺]]LB(P′).
Proof. Take any D ∈ [[λ]]UB(P′), by Lemma 4.9, D ∈
[[λ]]UB(P). By assumption, D ∈ [[̺]]LB(P), and by
Lemma 4.10, D ∈ [[̺]]LB(P′). Hence the thesis. 
Because of Theorem 4.11, in the presence of un-
trusted roles we can deploy a monitoring procedure
very similar to that described after Theorem 3.12.
First we check that [[λ]]UB(P) ⊆ [[̺]]LB(P) holds
2.
While doing this, we compute a P-support Σ of
[[λ]]UB(P) for ̺—this time a Σ such that Σ ⊆ S. Sec-
ond, we have to build ΓGP (λ). Third, we monitor the
roles in Σ and in ΓGP (λ) so that each time a statement
defining a role in ΓGP (λ) (resp. Σ) is added to (resp.
deleted from) P , the constraint owner is warned.
When the constraint owner receives a warning, he
has to (a) check whether [[λ]]UB(P) ⊆ [[̺]]LB(P) still
holds, and (b) recompute ΓGP (λ) and Σ.
Example 4.12 Reconsider again Example 3.3. Sup-
pose that Emergency.dept is (the only role) not in G,
2Even if this does not hold, when neither λ nor ̺ is static, it
is possible that [[λ]]SP(P′) ⊆ [[̺]]SP(P′) for all P
′ reachable from
P. However, in general, for the class of constraints we con-
sider, determining this is PSPACE-hard [13], i.e., intractable.
Thus, our technique makes an efficient conservative approxi-
mation for the more general constraints we consider.
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then we have that Emergency.responsePersonnel 6∈
coreP(G). Therefore
ΓGP (Emergency.hazmatPersonnel) =
{ Emergency.hazmatPersonnel,
ATF.hazmatT raining }
Nonetheless, if ATF.hazmatDB ∈ S we have that
[[Emergency.hazmatPersonnel]]UB(P)
⊆ [[ATF.hazmatDB]]LB(P)
so by Theorem 4.5 we know that the constraint
Emergency.hazmatPersonnel ⊑ ATF.hazmatDB
is satisfied in all reachable P ′. By Theorem 4.11,
if the two roles Emergency.hazmatPersonnel, and
ATF .hazmatT raining, prompt a warning when a
statement defining one of them is added and the
role ATF .hazmatDB gives a warning when one of
its statement is removed, then the constraint needs
to be re-checked only when a warning is given.
In that case, we also have to recompute Σ and
ΓGP (Emergency.hazmatPersonnel). Theorem 4.11
guarantees that no matter which changes are made
to P , until a warning is given, we still have that every
reachable3 P ′ satisfies the constraint. 
5 Related Work
In database theory, an integrity constraint is a query
that must remain true after the database has been
updated. Originally, integrity constraints were in-
troduces to prevent incorrect updates and to check
the database for integrity. Nevertheless, integrity
constraints have later been used for a number of
purposes, ranging from query optimization to view
updating. We refer to [9, 6] for illustrative exam-
ples of the uses of integrity constraints in deductive
databases.
In Section 2, we listed several papers presenting
various trust management systems. None of these
incorporates a notion of integrity constrains. The
work in trust management that is most closely re-
lated is [13]. As we discussed at the beginning of
Section 4, that work is complimentary to ours. It
studies the problem of determining, given a state P ,
a role monitor R, and a constraint Q, whether there
is a reachable state in which Q is violated. By con-
trast, we analyze the problem of which roles must
have their definitions monitored to detect when such
a P is entered.
3Notice that changing P also changes the reachability rela-
tion, i.e., the set of reachable P ′s.
6 Conclusion
We introduce the use, monitoring, and enforcement
of integrity constraints in trust management-style au-
thorization systems. We consider the portions of the
policy state that must be monitored to detect vio-
lations of integrity constraints. We also address the
extra difficulty that not all participants in a trust
management system can be trusted to assist in such
monitoring, and show how many integrity constraints
can be monitored in a conservative manner so that
trusted participants detect and report if the system
enters a policy state from which evolution in unmoni-
tored portions of the policy could lead to a constraint
violation.
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A Proofs
Lemma 3.7 Let P ′ = P ∪ {stmt}, where head(stmt) 6∈ ΓP(A.r), then
(a) [[A.r]]SP(P) = [[A.r]]SP(P′), and
(b) ΓP(A.r) = ΓP′(A.r).
Moreover, if P ′ is obtained from P by (a) adding zero or more statements whose head is not in ΓP(A.r),
and (b) removing zero or more statements, then
(c) [[A.r]]SP(P) ⊇ [[A.r]]SP(P′), and
(d) ΓP(A.r) ⊇ ΓP′(A.r).
Proof.
(a) Let P = SP(P), and P ′ = SP(P ′). First, summarize some logic-programming notation: we denote by
BP the Herbrand base of P (and P
′), consisting of the set of all ground (variable-free) atoms. Ground(P )
denotes the set of all ground instances of clauses in P . The usual TP operator is defined as follows: let
I ⊆ BP , then TP (I) = {H | H :− B1, . . . , Bn ∈ Ground(P ), and B1, . . . , Bn ∈ I}. As usual, we define
TP ↑0 (I) := I, and TP ↑n+1 (I) := TP (TP ↑n (I)). By well-known results (see e.g., [1]), since P contains no
function symbols, for some n we have that
TP ↑
n (∅) =MP = the least Herbrand model of P
Now we define the LP-counterpart of ΓP(A.r): Γatom = {m(B, r,D) | B.r ∈ ΓP(A.r)∧D ∈ Principals(P)}
and the complement Γatom = {m(B, r,D) | B.r 6∈ ΓP(A.r) ∧D ∈ Principals(P)}. Furthermore, let I and I ′
be two sets of ground atoms such that I ′ = I ∪ some atoms in Γatom, and I ⊆ MP . By the monotonicity
of TP , we have that
TP ′(I
′) ⊇ TP (I) (11)
We now want to show that
TP ′(I
′)\TP (I) ⊆ Γatom (12)
We proceed by contradiction and assume that there exists H such that
H ∈ TP ′(I
′)\TP (I) and H ∈ Γatom (13)
Since H ∈ TP ′(I
′), there exists a ground instance H :− B1, . . . , Bn of a clause cl ∈ P such that B1, . . . , Bn ∈
I ′. Since H ∈ Γatom, cl ∈ P . Therefore H ∈ TP (I ′). We now want to show that
B1, . . . , Bn ∈ Γatom (14)
Since I ′\I ⊂ Γatom, this will demonstrate that B1, . . . , Bn ∈ I, and therefore that H ∈ TP (I), contradicting
(13). We distinguish two cases according to the kind of statement from which cl is generated. Case 1:
cl is the LP-translation of a simple inclusion or intersection inclusion (not a linking inclusion). Then
B1, . . . , Bn ∈ Γatom by Definition 3.6. Case 2: cl is the LP-translation of a linking inclusion (linked role).
Then H :− B1, . . . , Bn has the formm(A, r,D) :− m(A, r1, B),m(B, r2, D). By Definition 3.6, m(A, r1, B) ∈
Γatom. Since I
′\I ⊂ Γatom, and m(A, r1, B) ∈ I ′, we have that m(A, r1, B) ∈ I. Since I ⊆ MP , then
B ∈ [[A.r]]SP(P). Therefore, again by Definition 3.6, m(B, r2, D) ∈ Γatom, proving (14) (which in turn
contradicts 13).
Now that we have proven (12), since for each m we have that TP ↑m⊆ MP , from (11), (12) and a
straightforward inductive reasoning it follows that, for each m,
TP ′ ↑
m (∅) ⊇ TP ↑
m (∅) and TP ′ ↑
m (∅)\TP ↑
m (∅) ⊆ Γatom
Since the least model of P ′ and P is the least fixpoint of these continuous operators on a finite lattice,
this demonstrates that MP ′\MP ⊆ Γatom. Since by definition A.r ∈ ΓP(A.r) it follows that [[A.r]]SP(P) =
[[A.r]]SP(P′). Hence the thesis.
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(b) Since head(stmt) 6∈ ΓP(A.r), head(stmt) is not reachable from A.r. So removing stmt does not alter
the reachability from A.r.
(c) and (d) First notice that, by construction,
ΓP(A.r) ⊇ Γ(P\{cred})(A.r) (15)
Now, suppose that we have a chain P = P0,P1, . . . ,Pn = P1, where each Pi+1 is obtained from Pi by either
adding a statement whose head is not in ΓP(A.r) or removing a statement. We now show by induction on
i that for each i ∈ [1, n]: [[A.r]]SP(P) ⊇ [[A.r]]SP(Pi ) and ΓP(A.r) ⊇ ΓPi(A.r), which imply the thesis. The
base case is trivial, as P1 = P , for the inductive case we have two subcases: Case 1. If Pi+1 is obtained
from Pi by adding a statement stmt such that head(stmt) 6∈ ΓP(A.r), then by the inductive hypothesis
head(stmt) 6∈ ΓPi(A.r), and, by statements (a) and (b) we have that [[A.r]]SP(Pi ) = [[A.r]]SP(Pi+1 ) and
ΓPi(A.r) = ΓPi+1(A.r), and the result follows from the inductive hypothesis. Case 2. If Pi+1 is obtained
from Pi by removing a statement, then the result follows from the monotonicity of [[A.r]]SP(Pi ) (1), and (15).

Proposition 4.7 Let P be a set of statements and G be a set of roles. If A.r 6∈ coreP(G), then [[A.r]]UB(P) =
Principals(P) ∪ {⊤}.
Proof. Consider the following closure operator on sets of roles (clP : ℘(Roles(P)) → ℘(Roles(P))). Let ∆
be a set of roles.
clP(∆) = ∆
∪ {A.r | A.r ←− B.r ∈ P and B.r ∈ ∆}
∪ {A.r | A.r ←− A.r1.r2 ∈ P and A.r1 ∈ ∆}
∪ {A.r | A.r ←− A.r1.r2 ∈ P and ∃B ∈ [[A.r1]]UB(P) such that B.r2 ∈ ∆}
∪ {A.r | A.r ←− B1.r1 ∩ . . . Bn.rn ∈ P and ∀i ∈ [1, n] Bi.ri ∈ ∆}
It is easy to see that coreP(G) is—by construction—exactly the least fixpoint of clP containing G, the
complement of G. Now, define clP ↑ 0(∆) := ∆, and clP ↑ n+ 1(∆) := clP(clP ↑ n(∆)). Since clP is
monotonically increasing, and since ℘(Roles(P)) is finite, we have that, for some n.
clP ↑ n(G) = least fixpoint of clP containing G = coreP(G) (16)
Now, by definition, for every A.r ∈ G, [[A.r]]UB(P) = Principals(P) ∪ {⊤}.
By the definition of clP , it is straightforward to check that this implies that for every A.r ∈ clP(G),
[[A.r]]UB(P) = Principals(P) ∪ {⊤}.
By iterating this reasoning it is straightforward to check that this implies that for every A.r ∈ clP ↑ n(G),
[[A.r]]UB(P) = Principals(P) ∪ {⊤}.
The thesis follows from (16). 
B Computing the Support Bottom-Up
We now show how one can compute the support in bottom-up way. We do this by defining a semantics:
JS : Roles(P) → ℘(Principals(P) × ℘(Roles(P))) for which it holds that if JSP(A.r) ∋ 〈D, Σ〉 then Σ
is a minimal P-support of D in A.r. The construction is parametric wrt the partial order used to define
minimality.
Definition B.1 (Justified Set Semantics JS) In the following algorithm CurrentSet and OldSet are
mappings Roles(P) → ℘(Principals(P)×℘(Roles(P))×N). We say that 〈D1, Σ1, i1〉 subsumes 〈D2, Σ2, i2〉
iff D1 = D2 and Σ1 ⊆ Σ2.
init phase
for each role A.r, CurrentSet(A.r) := ∅
repeat
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for each role A.r, do OldSet(A.r) := CurrentSet (A.r)
for each stmt ∈ P do
if stmt = A.r ←− B then
remove from CurrentSet (A.r) all triples subsumed by 〈B, {A.r}, 1〉
CurrentSet (A.r) := CurrentSet (A.r) ∪ {〈B, {A.r}, 1〉}
if stmt = A.r ←− B.s then
for each 〈D, Σ, i〉 ∈ CurrentSet (B.s) do
if 〈D, Σ ∪ {A.r}, i+ 1〉 is not subsumed by any triple in CurrentSet (A.r) then
remove from CurrentSet (A.r) all triples subsumed by 〈D, Σ ∪ {A.r}, i+ 1〉
CurrentSet (A.r) := CurrentSet(A.r) ∪ {〈D, Σ ∪ {A.r}, i+ 1〉}
if stmt = A.r ←− A.r1.r2 then
for each 〈B, Σ1, i1〉 ∈ CurrentSet(A.r1) do
for each 〈D, Σ2, i2〉 ∈ CurrentSet (B.r2) do
if 〈D, Σ1 ∪ Σ2 ∪ {A.r}, i1 + i2〉 is not subsumed by any triple in CurrentSet(A.r) then
remove from CurrentSet(A.r) all triples subsumed by 〈D, Σ1 ∪ Σ2 ∪ {A.r}, i1 + i2〉
CurrentSet(A.r) := CurrentSet (A.r) ∪ {〈D, Σ1 ∪ Σ2 ∪ {A.r}, i1 + i2〉}
if stmt = A.r ←− B1.r1 ∩ B2.r2 then
for each 〈D, Σ1, i1〉 ∈ CurrentSet (B1.r1) do
if, for some Σ2, i2 〈D, Σ2, i2〉 ∈ CurrentSet (B2.r2) then
if 〈D, Σ1 ∪ Σ2 ∪ {A.r}, i1 + i2〉 is not subsumed by any triple in CurrentSet(A.r) then
remove from CurrentSet(A.r) all triples subsumed by 〈D, Σ1 ∪ Σ2 ∪ {A.r}, i1 + i2〉
CurrentSet(A.r) := CurrentSet (A.r) ∪ {〈D, Σ1 ∪ Σ2 ∪ {A.r}, i1 + i2〉}
until for each role A.r, OldSet(A.r) = CurrentSet (A.r)
Then, for each role A.r, we define JSP(A.r) := {〈D, Σ〉 | ∃i CurrentSet(A.r) ∋ 〈D, Σ, i〉}. 
The following result demonstrates that this semantics is equivalent to the standard one, and that it
provides us with appropriate support-sets.
Theorem B.2 Let A.r be a role, D a principal, and P a state. Then 〈D, Σ0〉 ∈ JSP(A.r) if and only if
Σ0 is a minimal P-support of D in A.r.
Proof. (⇐) Assume Σ0 is a minimal set of roles such that D ∈ [[A.r]]SP(P|Σ0 ). We show by induction on the
construction of TSP(P|Σ0 ) ↑
n (∅) that for all j and for each A0.r0 ∈ Σ0, if m(A0, r0, D) ∈ TSP(P|Σ0 ) ↑
j (∅),
then at some stage in the execution of the algorithm, for some i and Σ, 〈D, Σ, i〉 ∈ CurrentSet(A0.r0) with
Σ ⊆ Σ0. The desired result then follows by taking A0.r0 = A.r, by using the fact, shown below in the second
part of the proof, that 〈D, Σ, i〉 ∈ CurrentSet(A0.r0) implies m(A0, r0, D) ∈ TSP(P|Σ ) ↑
n (∅), and by using
the minimality of Σ0.
Basis. When j = 0, the result is trivial.
Step. We assume the hypothesis holds for j and show that it holds for j +1. We proceed by case analysis
of the clause used to add m(A0, r0, D) to TSP(P|Σ0 ) ↑
j+1 (∅). We show here only the case of linking inclusion;
the other cases are similar.
Case: m(A0, r0, ?Z) :− m(A0, r1, ?Y ),m(?Y, r2, ?Z) ∈ SP(P|Σ0 ). By definition of TP , there exists B such
that m(A0, r1, B),m(B, r2, D) ∈ TSP(P|Σ0 ) ↑
j (∅). So by induction hypothesis, there exist i1, i2,Σ1,Σ2 such
that Σ1,Σ2 ⊆ Σ0, 〈B, Σ1, i1〉 ∈ CurrentSet(A0.r1), and 〈D, Σ2, i2〉 ∈ CurrentSet(B.r2) by some stage
in the execution. Consider the first such stage. In the following iteration, either CurrentSet(A0.r0) already
contains a triple that subsumes 〈D, Σ1 ∪ Σ2 ∪ {A0.r0}, i1 + i2 + 1〉, or else this triple is added. In either
case, at the end of the iteration, CurrentSet(A0.r0) contains a triple that subsumes 〈D, Σ0, k〉, for all k.
(Note Σ1 ∪Σ2 ∪ {A0.r0} ⊆ Σ0.)
(⇒) We show by induction on i that if 〈D, Σ, i〉 ∈ CurrentSet(A.r), then m(A, r,D) ∈ TSP(P) ↑
n (∅).
This direction of the theorem then follows because, by the other direction, all minimal P-support are in
CurrentSet(A.r), and the algorithm removes all entries that are subsumed by other entries.
Basis. i = 1. In this case, Σ = {A.r} and there is a statement A.r←−D ∈ P . In this case m(A, r,D) ∈
SP(P|Σ ), so m(A, r,D) ∈ TSP(P) ↑
j+1 (∅) for all j ∈ N.
Step. We assume the hypothesis holds for all i ≤ k and show that it holds for i = k + 1. We proceed by
case analysis of the statement used to add 〈D, Σ, k + 1〉 to CurrentSet(A.r). We show here only the case
of linking inclusion; the other cases are similar.
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Case: A.r ←− A.r1.r2. In this case there are Σ1, Σ2, i1, i2, and B such that 〈B, Σ1, i1〉 ∈
CurrentSet(A.r1), 〈D, Σ2, i2〉 ∈ CurrentSet(B.r2), k = i1 + i2, and Σ = Σ1 ∪ Σ2 ∪ {A.r}. By in-
duction hypothesis, m(A, r1, B) ∈ TSP(P|Σ1 ) ↑
n (∅) and m(B, r2, D) ∈ TSP(P|Σ2 ) ↑
n (∅). By monotonic-
ity of TP in P , it follows that m(A, r1, B),m(B, r2, D) ∈ TSP(P|Σ) ↑
n (∅). Consider the first j such
that m(A, r1, B),m(B, r2, D) ∈ TSP(P|Σ ) ↑
j (∅). Because m(A, r, ?Z) :− m(A, r1, ?Y ),m(?Y, r2, ?Z) is in
SP(P|Σ ), it follows that m(A, r1, D) ∈ TSP(P|Σ ) ↑
j+1 (∅), the latter being a subset of TSP(P|Σ ) ↑
n (∅). 
It must be acknowledged that the algorithm given here may construct a value for CurrentSet whose size
is combinatorial in the size of P . In practice, a variant of this algorithm should be used in which a small
constant number of entries in CurrentSet(A.r) are stored for each D ∈ [[A.r]]SP(P).
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